

### The Challenge:



How can we derive duties to future generations without gaining unnecessary metaphysical baggage or ending up with unresolved philosophical puzzles?

### Recipient-Oriented Strategy

- **Strategy:** We can derive these duties by considering future people on the receiving end of our current actions. Future nonexistent people can be *harmed* by my actions and our policies.
- Derek Parfit's Non-Identity Problem: : “in the different [projected] outcomes [of possible decisions], different people would be born” (359)
  - Time-Dependence Claim: The time of conception determines which particular person will come into existence
  - A morally repugnant policy that changes the composition of the population *cannot* make those individuals *worse off* (unless their lives are not worth living), since those *particular* people would not have existed at all without the institution of that policy. So what makes the policy problematic?

### Agent-Oriented Strategy

- **Strategy:** We can derive these duties by laying out how we, individually and collectively, are constrained in virtue of our practical reason and relational nature.
- Michael Bratman's theory + relational view of human agency
  - Distinctive traits of human agency: *reflectiveness, planfulness, temporal extension*
  - Intentions must be *coherent* and *consistent* to be effective.
  - Social institutions are fundamental in process of socialization and embody collective intentions, enable social coordination and planning.
  - Side-constraint: require affiliative bonds; deeply dependent on others
  - Social institutions have open-ended intentions and extend our collective intentions.
  - Our lives overlap with the lives of multiple generations.
  - Given all of these constraints, policies that govern social institutions should not contradict our intentions for current generations by planning a future inconsistent with a way of life we endorse.



Elizabeth Victor and Laura Guidry-Grimes

Contact Information

Elizabeth Victor, Ph.D. ♦ evictor@mail.usf.edu

Visiting Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Laura Guidry-Grimes, M.A. ♦ lkg8@georgetown.edu

Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University



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